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Abstract
The debate on macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy has focused
on the question of whether the timing of taxes matters but has neglected the
study of the relevance of the timing of public spending.
This paper tries
to fill that hole by presenting a model of dynamic fiscal policy where firms
behave non competitively and households have finite horizons.
I show that
the existence of monopoly rents makes the timing of future government
spending relevant. In particular I show that, contrary to the prediction of
most other models of fiscal policy, an anticipated increase in public
spending financed by subsequent tax increases may have expansionary effects
as the positive wealth effect associated with monopoly rents outweights the
negative wealth effect of anticipated higher taxes. I also show that if the
public spending expansion is financed by subsequent public spending
contraction, the experiment has unambiguous expansionary effects.
The model presented can be thought as a microfounded story of
Blanchard's Good-News-Bad-News model of public policy.

(0) INTRODUCTION

The recent debate on macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy has
been centered around the question of whether the timing of taxes has real
effects.

The Ricardian view revived by Barro (1974) argues that if

individuals are intergenerationally linked through bequests, the timing of
lump sum taxes is irrelevant as long as the present value of those taxes
remains unchanged.

Keynesian economists, on the other hand, argue that it

is the actual path rather than the present value of taxes what has real
economic consequences.

They believe that a debt financed temporary tax cut

will increase aggregate demand and current interest rates which will reduce
investment and the long run capital stock.

They argue that the assumptions

underlying the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem are unrealistic.

Blanchard

(1985) shows that if agents have finite horizons a debt financed tax cut
will be expansionary.

Tobin (1980) argues that if the lump sum taxes are

substituted by distortionary income taxes, a temporary tax cut will increase
interest rates.

Judd (1985) and Barro (1990) show that this is not always

the case since the substitution effects going in the direction of decreasing
consumption may dominate.

Barsky et al. (1986) and Kimball and Mankiw

(1989) argue that, if income is uncertain, future income taxes are a form of
insurance.

Hence a debt financed tax cut will reduce overall uncertainty

and increase current consumption.

Barro (19-90)·shows that-the existence of

some liquidity constrained agents yields both Non-Ricardian and
Non-Keynesian results.
The relevance of the timing of government spending, on the other hand,
is a largely unquestioned issue.

In all the models mentioned above the

1

timing of future government spending does not have any effect on current
real variables as long as the path of future taxes remains unchanged1
Consider a small open economy with infinitely lived households.

If the

government announces that it will increase future spending (say at t ) and
1
finances it with subsequent spending cuts (say at t >t ), nothing real will
2 1
happen today as long as the present value of taxes remains constant.

When

the increase in spending occurs the country will run a current account
deficit, which will be finance with future surpluses.

If the economy is

closed (and output supply is inelastic with respect to interest rates) there
will be an increase in real interest rates in t
occur today.

1

but no real changes will

Under finite horizons the answers will be the same if (not

only the present value but) the whole future path of taxes remains constant.
One may think, however, that there are rents associated with government
spending, especially if the sectors in which the government operates behave
non-competitively.

Hall (1988) estimates the ratio of the difference

between price and marginal cost to price (what I will later define as profit
rate) and finds that for most industries this profit rate is substantially
2
different from zero .

1

Under these circumstances the timing of public

I am assuming, as most of the models mentioned do, that public spending

does not enter private utility or private production.

See Baily (1971) for

models where public expenditures are partial substitutes for private
consumption or are inputs of private production.

I am also abstracting from

the effects of current government spending on current aggregate demand which
we know that, if temporary, has expansionary effects.
2

It is .545 for construction, .514 for durables, .677 for nondurables,

.687 for transportation, .736 for trade, .697 for Finance, Insurance and

2

spending may have real consequences as it implies an intertemporal
redistribution of monopoly rents.

Thus, modeling the economy as a set of

monopolistic firms may yield surprising results.

There are a number of

recent papers which model fiscal policy in the context of imperfect
competition (see for instance Hart (1982), Mankiw (1987), Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987), Silvestre (1988) or Startz (1989)).

Due to their static

nature, these models are inadequate for answering the dynamic questions
addressed here.
In this paper I propose a dynamic model of fiscal policy where firms
behave monopolisticaly.

I find that the existence of monopoly rents or

profits associated with public purchases means that the timing of public
spending may no longer be irrelevant.

Changes in the timing of spending

will imply changes in the timing at which these rents accrue.

If

individuals care about the timing of their income (as they do if, for
instance, they have finite horizons or if credit markets are not perfect),
then the timing of public spending will have current real effects.

I also

find that the existence of monopoly rents does not affect the Ricardian
conclusions on the timing of taxes.

Finally I show that an anticipated bond

financed increase in public spending financed with future tax increases may
have expansionary effects today as the positive wealth effect associated
with the monopoly rents may outweigh the negative wealth effect of future
higher taxes.

This non-conventional result contrasts with the unambiguously

Real Estate and .464 for services.

At a more disaggregate level he finds

that the profit rate is as high as .972 for communications industries, very
close to the maximum possible value, 1 ..

3

contractionary effects found in perfectly competitive models 3 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
consumer behavior.

In section 1 I describe

I take the population structure from Blanchard (1985).

I assume that, at every point in time, consumers have to choose how much to
spend and save and how to allocate their total expenditures among a range of
existing goods.

In section 2 describes public behavior.

The government

chooses a stream of expenditures and taxes and the allocation of these
expenditures across goods.

Firms are described in section 3.

They use a

technology involving fixed costs and constant marginal costs.

Since they

face constant elasticity demand functions, their optimal price implies a
constant mark-up.

Firms generate monopoly rents which are equally

distributed across households.
model.

Section 4 describes the equilibrium of the

Section 5 proposes an index of fiscal stance which incorporates the

existence of monopoly rents.

In Section 6 I perform three fiscal policy

experiments and find that the introduction of imperfect competition yields
some non-convention al results.

Section 7 concludes the paper.

3

Blanchard (1981) has a pseudo-dynamic version of the IS/LM model where
he finds that increases in G may have expansionary or contractionary
effects.

In the "Good News Case" where the parameters of the model are such
that an increase in output triggers a boom in the stock market, an increase
in public spending is expansionary.

,public spending is contractionary.

In the "Bad News Case" an increase in
In this sense, one could view the

present paper as a micro-foundatio n for the Blanchard "Good news-Bad news"
model.

4

(1) HOUSEHOLDS.

The structure of the population is taken from Blanchard (1985).

Thus I

will assume that the economy is populated by individuals facing a constant
probability of death,

p

4

.

Total population is assumed not to grow so a new

cohort (normalized to be of size p) joins the economy at every instant.
time t, therefore, the size of the cohort born at time zero is
total size of the population is 1.

pe-pt

At

so the

Individuals face an uncertainty problem

since they do not know when they are going to die.

They maximize an

expected utility function subject to a dynamic budget constraint.

Given

that the probability of being alive at time vis ep(t-v), the individual
objective function is:

co

(1.1)

MAX E

I

co

u(s,v) e

t

-o(v-t)

dv

t

-(S+p)(v-t)

u(s,v) e

dv

t

where u(s,v) is the instantaneous utility function at time v for individuals
born at times.

As in Spence (1976) and Dixit and Sitglitz (1977) I will

assume that there is a variety of consumption goods.

4

This implies

that

the

random

variable

"time

exponential distribution with parameter p, where p
value.

Although this is not a

until

can

take

The expected value of this exponential distribution is

be interpreted as the time horizon (expected
case where p=O, the

economy

is

populated

horizon.

5

lifetime).
by

In

individuals

death"
any
-1
p

is

an

positive
which can

the

limiting

with

infinite

critical assumption, I will assume that the marginal utility of a good i is
independent of all other goods.

N
(1.2) u(s,v)

~

c.(s,v)

i=l

1

The instantaneous utility function is

1-a
/(1-a)

where, in order to get well behaved demand functions O<a<l will be assumed.
Further, in order to ensure positive consumption I will assume that the
parameters a and Sare such that r-(1/a)(r-S)>O applies.
Each individual is assumed to be born with zero non-human wealth.

The

mere fact of being alive, however, allows him to collect a share of the
profits of the company.

I will not assume that there exists a stock market

and that the profits are distributed in the form of dividends among the
shareholders.

Recent studies show that most of the monopoly rents accrue to

workers rather than capital owners.

For instance Katz and Summers (1989)

examine panel data for the United States and show that there is a strong
positive correlation between total industry rents and labor rents.

They

also show that labor rents seem closely related to firm's capital-labor
ratio.

They interpret these findings as evidence of the leverage that labor

has in extracting monopoly rents.
find similar results for Japan.

Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1988)
Hence, I will assume that the monopoly

profits will be equally distributed across currently alive individuals in
the form of higher wages.
A key assumption is the existence of perfect annuity markets:
individuals may contract to receive
to their death.

pw

every instant and to pay w contingent

In the absence of a bequest motive, consumers will find it

optimal to have such contracts (see Blanchard (1985) and Blanchard and

6

Fischer (1989)).

The effective rate of return for each private individual

will be p+r(t) where r(t) is the rate of return on financial assets.

Notice

that consumers in debt will be required to pay a premium -pw to account for
the risk of defaulting which they will do with probability p.
Let ~(s,v), r(s,v) and w(s,v) be respectively, profits, taxes and
financial wealth at time t of an individual born at times.

Taxes are

assumed to be lump sum (but since I do not allow for leisure choice an
equivalent assumption would be a consumption tax).
I will assume that the interest rate is fixed.

I will think of the

model as describing a small open economy that takes the interest as given.
Under this interpretation an increase in current aggregate demand will
generate a current account deficit since aggregate supply is fixed.

One

could also think that I am only modeling the demand side of the economy.
Given the interest inelastic aggregate supply, movements in aggregate demand
will generate similar movements in real interest rates so as to clear the
real bond market.

Finally, the model could be extended to include

intertemporal leisure choice as in Barro (1989).
in this case be interest rate elastic.

The aggregate supply would

Changes in aggregate demand would

generate partial increases in work effort and output and partial increases
in interest rates 5 .

But for now let me just thing about an internationally

given real interest rate.

5

Of course in this case the individual choice of work effort would not

be independent of the wealth effects of the model.

7

Thus, individuals face the following dynamic budget constraint (DBC):

(1.3) w(s,v) = 8w(s,v)/8v =
N

= (r+p)w(s,v) + E(s,v) + ~(s,v) - r(s,v) where all variables are expressed in terms of labor.

L p.c.(s,v)
1 1
i=l
The term pw(s,v) is

the return from the annuities market and E(s,v) is labor income.

All

households work the same amount of time, they have the same productivity and
their labor income is constant over time.

That is, E(s,v)=E(v)=E for alls

and v.
The individual household program can be solved in two steps.

First

choose consumption of each individual variety, c.(s,v), subject to a given
l..

total expenditure x(s,v).

(1.4) Max

That is

N
1-a
L c.(s,v)
/(1-a)
1
i=l

N

subject to

L p.c.(s,v)=x(s,v)
1 1
i=l

the first order conditions of this program imply
N

(1.5) c. (s,v)
l..

-(1/a)/( ~
~
p. (a-1)/a)
l..
• 1 l..
l..=

X ( S,V ) p.

Equation (1.5) is the time v demand of good i from individuals born at
times.

Second choose the optimal amount of expenditure in each period.

This can be readily done by plugging (1.5) in u(s,v) and choosing x(s,v) so
as to maximize (1.2) subject to (1.3).
known

8

The first order conditions are well

(1.6) x(s,v)/x(s, v) = (r - o)/a

where x(s,v)=8x(s ,v)/8v.

Individual consumption expenditure growth is

linearly related to the difference between the real interest rate and the
subjective rate of time preference.

Consumers also need to satisfy a

limiting transversal ity condition.

The optimal individual consumption

expenditure at each time t can be found by solving the differentia l equation
in (1.6) between times v and t

and using the dynamic budget constraint

(1.3)

(1.7) x(s,t)-(r+p -(r-&)/u){w (s,t)+J•-(r+ p)(v-t)[E+t t(s,v)-,(s,v) ]dv}
t

That is, individual consumption expenditure will be a fraction of
financial plus human wealth, where human wealth equals the present value of
all future labor incomes net of taxes plus profits or monopoly rents.

The

constant marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is equal to
(r+p-(r-o)/a ) which is positive.

The total private demand for good i at

time v can be found by integrating (1.5) across all individuals , s

(1.8) C.(v)
1

V

where C.(v) is total consumption and X(v)
1

Jx(s,v)pep(s-v)ds
-oo

private expenditure in terms of labor.

9

is the total

(2) GOVERNMENT.

The government collects lump sum taxes and spends the proceeds in all
goods.

To make it parallel to the private consumer case, I will assume that

the public demand for each good has the same elasticity as the private
demand.

That is

(2.1) G.(t)
l.

where Gi(t) is the real demand of good i and f(t) is total public
expenditure in terms of labor.

This simplifying assumption is not crucial

but it will allow me to easily aggregate private and public demand for each
individual firm.

I will further assume that the public purchase of these

private goods provides no private utility and does not affect the private
production function.

The government can borrow and lend at the

internationally given interest rate.

The dynamic budget constraint for the

government is, therefore:

(2.2) D(t)

rD(t) + r(t) - ~(t)

where D(t) is government debt and ~(t) is the total tax collection, both in
units of labor. The government is also subject to an intertemporal solvency
constraint which does not allow it to borrow infinitely.

(2.3) lim D(v) e

-rv

0

~

10

That is

(3) FIRMS.

As mentioned above there is a fixed number of firms, N, each of whom
enjoys a monopolistic position in the production of a single variety.
Consumers own the firms and earn the profits.

I will further assume that

the number of firms is large so every one of them is small relative to the
whole economy.

Thus, firms take aggregate expenditure as given.

The demand

function for each firm is the sum of private and public demands from (1.6)
and (2.1) respectively.
N

(3.1) Q.(t)
i

C.(t) + G.(t)
i

i

Y(t)p_-(1/a)/( ~ p. (a-1)/a)
i
i-1 i

where Q.(t) is real demand of good i, Y(t) is the total aggregate
i

expenditure (equal to total private X(t) and public expenditures f(t)), and
p.(t) is the relative price of output in terms of labor.
i

denominator is an aggregate price level.

The term in the

If N is large enough, they will

ignore this term and their perceived elasticity will be approximately

6

1/a.

The operating profits are the difference between sales income and total

6

N

l/a+[(a-l)/a]p~a-l)/a/~p~a-1)/a
i
l i
all varieties are equally priced (as it will happen in equilibrium),

the

second term of the elasticity becomes (a-1)/Na, and it goes to zero

the

The true elasticity is equal

number of firms goes to infinity.

to

The 1/a approximation is

set of potential varieties is a continuum and the set
nonzero measure.

of

exact
varieties

See Helpman and Krugman (1986) for further

this issue.

11

as
when

If

the

is

of

discussion

of

cost.

The cost structure is assumed to be a fixed sunk cost panda

constant marginal cost 7.

(3.2) Il.(Q.)
i
i

Thus, the operating profits for firm i are

p.Q.
- 7Q.i
i
i

I am assuming that each individual owns a small fraction of firms 7 .
Given the instantaneous utility function in (2.1) individuals would like to
spread any given expenditure among as many products as possible 8
will be optimal for household purchase all available goods.

Hence, it

Therefore every

household will be receiving rents from only one (or few) firms and
purchasing goods from all of them.

This is important because, as owners of

firms, individuals would like to increase prices so as to maximize profits.
But as consumers, they want prices to be as low as possible.

Since

consumers own the firms, one could be tempted to say that the optimal
solution is the competitive (pareto optimal) pricing with no monopoly rents.
The existence of an asymmetry between the number of markets in which they
buy and sell ensures that firms will want to maximize profits.

If they do,

the first order condition at each moment involves constant mark up pricing

(3.3) p.
i

7

7/(l-a)

In fact, if we interpret profits as monopoly rents accruing to workers,

we can assume that each household works in only one firm.
8

The marginal utility of the number of goods holding constant the total
expenditure is positive and equal to aN-(l-a)X(l-a) where N is the number of
varieties and Xis total consumption expenditure.

12

Notice that the price is independent of i and t.
for all i and t.

Let me define pit=p

Using (3.1) we see that the real quantity of good i sold

at moment tis

(3.4) Q.(t) = Y(t) /(Np)
l.

which is also independent of i.

The Aggregate Quantity of goods produced,

Q, Aggregate Consumption, C, and Total Real Government Purchases, Gare,
respectively

(3.5)

Q(t)

Y(t)/p

C(t)

X(t)/p

G(t) = r(t)/p
N
N
N
where Q=~ .• C=~C. and G=~G ..
1 l.
1 l.
1 l.

Individual profits can now be calculated

using the optimal price (3. 3).

Aggregate profits are the sum of individual

profits across all existing firms
N

(3.6) II(t)

~ 11".

i=l

1.

pNQ. (t)--yNQ. (t)
l.

l.

where µ=(p--y)/p is the profit margin.
of aggregate expenditure, Y(t).

Thus, profits are a constant fraction

At this points, most models assume that

there is free entry so the zero profit condition determines the number of
firms and varieties, N (see for instance Helpman and Krugman (1986),
Grossman and Helpman (1989)and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990)).

13

This

assumption allows them to ignore profits as part of households' income.

In

the present paper, however, this assumption is not made for two reasons.
First, unlike the authors above, I am interested in relatively high
frequency economic events related to short run fiscal policy.

It seems more

reasonable to assume that, in the short run, the number of firms (and
products) is given and that changes in economic conditions are reflected in
changes in short run monopoly rents.

Second, I am interested in studying

the role that these monopoly rents play in government fiscal policy.
Setting them equal to zero would make the whole problem uninteresting.

(4) AGGREGATE BEHAVIOR AND GENERAL SOLUTION.

Let aggregate consumption, private wealth, profits and taxes be
respectively, C(t), W(t), Il(t) and ~(t).

These aggregate variables are all

related to their individual counterparts by the following expression:
t

(4.1) Z(t)

J

z(s,t)pep(s-t)ds

for z()=w(),c(),~() and r().

-ro

So every aggregate variable is the sum across households of its
individual counterpart.

Since I am assuming that this is an open economy,

the economy as a whole can borrow or lend the difference between aggregate
demand and the exogenously given aggregate supply at the world real interest
rate.

The current account is, therefore, the difference between national

income (interest payments plus wages plus profits, rF+E+Il = rF+E+(p-~)Q)

14

minus national expenditure (Y=pQ).

(4.2) F

CA

rF + E - ~Q

where Fis an international asset denominated in labor units (it pays rF
units of labor every instant).
and public debt.

Households hold two type of assets, foreign

Thus private wealth evolves according to the following

differential equation 9

(4.3) W(t)

rW(t) + E - ~(t) + µr(t) -(1-µ)X(t)

where equations (2.2) and (3,7) have been used.

Notice that aggregate

private wealth does NOT accumulate at the individual rate (p+r) but at the
rater.

The reason is that the amount pW(t) is an annuity market

transfer

from the individuals who die to the individuals who remain alive so
aggregate wealth is not affected by it.

The optimal aggregate consumption

expenditure is

(4.4) X(t)=

- (r+p-(r-6)/u)[Y (t) + J.-(r+p)(v-t)[E + Il(v) - ~(v)]dv]
t

9

w

F+D = (rF+E-~D)+(rD+r -~) = rW+E-[~/p]pQ+r- ~ =
rW+E-(1-µ)X+µr- ~. An alternative way of writing this

expression

is

to take into account that µ(X+r)=Il and see that W = rW+E+IT-~-X which states
that increases in private wealth (savings) equal private income (including
profits and net of taxes) minus private expenditure.

15

Aggregate consumption is a constant fraction of the human and financial
wealth of those currently alive.

Since profits are a constant fraction of

aggregate demand (IT(t)=µY(t)) and aggregate demand is the sum of private
consumption plus government expenditures (Y(t) - X(t) + r(t)), equation
(4.4) can be rewritten as

(4.5) X(t)

(r+p-(r-6)/a) ( W(t) + M(t) + µK(t))

where W(t) = D(t) + F(t) is total financial wealth,
00

M(t)=Je-(r+p)(v-t)[E + - ~(v)+ µr(v)]dv is the present value of all labor
t

incomes minus taxes and plus the contributions of all future government
00

expenditures to profits and µK(t) = µJe-(r+p)(v-t) X(v)dv is the present
t

value of all future contributions of consumption to profits.

Equations

(4.3) and (4.5) form the key system of equations which, as shown in the
appendix, can be rewritten in real terms as

(4.6)

C(t)

(1/a)(r-o)C(t) - (r+p-(r-6)/a)p(l-µ)W(t)/1

W(t)/1

-C(t) + rW(t)/1 + {E/1-T(t)/(l-µ)+µ/(l-µ)G(t)}

where C, T, G, E/1 and W/1 are real consumption, real tax payments, real
government expenditures, real labor income and real assets respectively.
The perfect-foresight-no-bubble algebraic solution for the initial value of

16

consumption (derived in the appendix) is

~

(4.7) C(O)

~( W(O) +

J

e

-As
1

[E/~-T(t)/(1-µ)+(µ/(l-µ))G(t)]ds)

0

where~ and Al are, respectively:
(4.8)

~

= (1/2)(s +

~

-(1/a)(r-s))

(4.9) Al - (1/2)((1/a)(r-S) + r + ~) > r > 0

2
and~= /(r-(l/a)(r-S) +4(r+p-(r-S)/a)p(l-µ)

Notice that the economy's marginal propensity to consume out of total
wealth,~. is positive as long as r-(1/a)(r-S)>O. The term r-(1/a)(r-S) is
the marginal propensity in an infinite horizon perfect competition model of
consumption (this can be seen by setting p-0).

See Blanchard and Fischer

(1989) for an interpretation of this propensity in terms of income,
substitution and wealth effects.
Note also that the economy's discount rate, Al is always larger or
equal tor.

It is exactly equal tor only under infinite horizons (p=O).

Further, Al is a decreasing function of the profit margin,µ.
competitive pricing, Al equals (r+p).

Finally,

Under

under infinite horizon, the

existence of a positive profit margin does not change any of the
propensities to consume or effective discount rates.

The reason is that if

individuals have infinite horizons they do not really care when they receive
the profits (as long as their present value is held constant).

17

(5) AN INDEX OF FISCAL STANCE.

Intertemporal models of fiscal policy suggest that looking at current
deficits only may not be the correct way to measure the impact of fiscal
policy on aggregate demand: the stream of all future deficits may also play
an important role.

Blanchard (1985) proposes an index of fiscal stance to

summarize these effects.

It includes the direct (expansionary) effect of

government expenditures and the indirect (contractionary) effect of current
anticipated future tax increases on current wealth and consumption.

The

introduction of imperfect competition suggests a modification of this index.
Collecting the policy terms that affect aggregate demand in equation (4.7)
we can define the new index as:

(5.1) IFS(t)=

[ J

CX)-A 1 (v-t)

=G(t)+e d(t)- e

]
uCX)-A 1 (v-t)
]
T(v)/(1-µ)dv +eµ e
G(v)/(1-µ)dv

t

t

The first two terms are parallel to Blanchard's.

The multiplier is

different to reflect the iterative effects of consumption on profits.
third term is new.
profits:

The

It reflects the effects of future public spending on

future government spending will have a future expansionary effect.

This, in turn, will have a positive effect on contemporaneous profits.
Since consumption today is a fraction of the present value of all future
incomes (including future profits), consumption and aggregate demand today
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10

will expand

This expansionary effect will tend to offset the old

contractionary effect of future taxes stressed by Blanchard (1985).

(6) SOME FISCAL POLICY EXPERIMENTS.

We are now ready to use the model to analyze the macroeconomic
implications of several fiscal policy experiments such as changes in the
timing of taxes and government expenditures.

I will first show that

imperfect competition does not change the qualitative results of changing
the timing of taxes.

Then I will show that, differently from traditional

dynamic models of public finance, the present model suggests that changing
· the timing of government purchases ·has real effects and that anticipated
increases in public spending may be expansionary.

Policy Experiment I.- A bond financed temporary tax cut.

We want to see what is the effect on current expenditure of a tax cut
in period t

1

financed by a tax increase in t

expenditure path constant.

2

(t >t ) leaving the public
2 1

rhe government's budget constraint says that the

two -tax changes must satisfy the relation:

(6. . 1) dT( tl ) + e-r(t2-t1)dT(t )
2

where h=t -t >0.
2 1

10

The

0

The effect of such a policy experiment on current

change in

the

consumption

path

will

also

affect

wealth

consumption. This has also been taken into account in solving the model.
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and

aggregate demand can be found by substituting this expression into equation
(4.7) (I normalize the current period to t=O):

(6.2) dQ(O)

-At
2
l
dT(t )]
2
-(A -r)h
dT(t )[1 - e
l
]
1
dT(t ) + e
1

Since Al is always larger or equal tor (and exactly equal when p=O),
the effect of a tax cut on current consumption will always be nonnegative.
If agents are intergenerationally linked so they effectively have infinite
horizons, (p=O) the effect of a bond financed tax cut is null.
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem proposed by Barro (1974).

This the

On the other hand,

if the probability of dying (and shifting the tax burden to future
non-connected-to-us individuals) is positive, then the tax cut will be
expansionary, and the more expansionary the larger the period of time
elapsing between the tax cut and the tax hike.

As shown, among others, by

Blanchard (1985) the reason is that currently alive households assign a
nonzero probability to being alive at the moment of the tax cut and not
being around by the time of the tax hike.

They will, therefore, feel richer

and they will increase their current consumption.

The increase in current

consumption will be financed (in this particular model) with a current
account deficit.

In a closed economy where aggregate savings must end up

being null, the tax cut will translate into higher interest rates to
preclude people from excess borrowing.

Consumption of future generations

(in particular, generations alive at the time of the tax hike) will be
lower.

The country will then run trade surpluses that will help to pay the

debt inherited from today's individuals.

The whole experiment will end up

being a transfer of wealth from generations not yet born (and therefore with
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. 1 propensity
.
·
ll
a zero margina
to consume ) to current1ya1·ive generations

Hence, this model predicts similar qualitative effects of a temporary bond
financed tax cut as a model of perfect competition.

The quantitative

responses are different to reflect the iterative effects of profits on
consumption and vice versa (what Mankiw (1988) calls keynesian multiplier).

Policy Experiment II.- An anticipated bond financed increase
government expenditure financed with subsequent tax increases.

Consider now an increase in public spending at time t
increase in taxes at time t

2

where t >t .
2 1

financed with an

1

The government is constrained to

satisfy

The effect of this policy experiment on aggregate demand can readily be
found by substituting (6.4) in Equation (4.7)

11

As shown by Buiter (1986) and Weil (1987), it is

people will be born" and
matters.

not

that

"current

people

the

fact

will

be

that

"new

dead"

that

To see that, consider a world where people have infinite

but new agents enter the economy in a stochastic manner.

A

temporary

cut would Not be neutral because people would know that at the time
hike there would be more people around to pay taxes so the
rate would be smaller.
aggregate demand.

horizons

per

tax

of

tax

capita

tax

Therefore, they would expand current consumption and

Thus, it is the possibility of shifting taxes to somebody

with zero current Marginal Propensity to Consume and not the
the horizons which breaks the Ricardian results.
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finiteness

of

(6.5)

where h=t -t .
2 1

Which may be positive or negative, depending on the relative

sizes ofµ (profit margin),

p

(probability of death) and h (the time elapsed

between the moment of government spending and the moment of the tax
increase).

The first term [(~/(1-µ))µ] represents the expansionary effect

of future government expenditure (profit effect), the second term
-(A -r)h
1
[~/(1-µ)e
] corresponds to the contractionary effect of the future
tax increases.

Under perfect competition,µ is equal to zero so the profit

effect disappears.
contractionary.

Thus, anticipated government expenditures are invariably

If p=0, that is, if individuals have infinite horizons,

dQ(0)=-(r-(1/a)(r-o))o e

-Otl

dG(t )<0.
1

are again contractionary.

Hence, future government expansions

The reason is that under infinite horizon the

timing of taxes or profits do not matter so the only macroeconomic
implication of the experiment is the negative wealth effect of a larger
government.
But if people have finite horizons (p>O) and there is imperfect
competition (µ>0), then there is always an h for which future public
expenditures are expansionary today.

In other words there is always a

sufficiently large period of time between the profit increase and the tax
increase that will lead households to increase consumption.

This policy

experiment is equivalent to a transfer from future generations to the
present: the government buys output at market prices so it pays the
corresponding markup.

To finance that, it increases taxes in the future.

Hence, future generations are charged for the marginal cost of the output
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that the government purchases plus the profit that the firms (owned by
currently living individuals ) charge for their good.

This direct transfer

from the future is expansionar y if agents are not intergenera tionally
linked.

This feature is exclusive of imperfectly competitive economies

because the vehicle that generates these intertempor al transfers of public
expenditure s (the monopoly rent or profit) does not exist under competitive
pricing.

The transfer or profit effect represents a positive wealth effect

that tends to offset and maybe reverse the traditional negative wealth
effect of the anticipated tax increase (which, effectively , is a transfer or
resources in the other direction).
The ambiguous effect on current consumption translates into ambiguous
effects on the current account.

This, again, contrasts with the unambiguous

trade surplus that results in traditional models involving perfect
competition .

In a closed economy model, the ambiguous effect on current

aggregate demand would translate into similar movements of interest rates.
Traditional models predict a fall in real rates due to the unambiguous
contraction in aggregate demand.

Policy Experiment Ill.-.

An anticipated temporary increase in public

spending financed by subsequent cuts in public spending.

Finally, consider an anticipated increase in public purchases, financed
with a subsequent decrease in public spending leaving the path of taxes
unchanged.

Conventiona l models of public finance predict that the effects

on current aggregate demand of such a policy experiment will be zero.

The

reason is that government spending is generally assumed to be useless in the
sense of being unproductiv e or non substitutab le for private consumption .
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Given the path of taxes, public purchases have no effect on private income
or wealth.

Hence private consumption and aggregate demand are unaffected so

future public spending has no current real economic effect
proposing here has different implications.

12

.

The model I am

Despite the fact that public

spending is assumed to be non distorting in the sense of Baily (1971), it
affects contemporaneous income through monopoly rents.

Again, the

government budget constraint requires:

The change in aggregate demand can be found by substituting this
expression in Equation (4.7)

(6.8)

Notice that, as mentioned above, under competitive pricing (µ=0), this
effect is always zero.

The reason is that movements in future government

expenditures that leave the path of future taxes unchanged can have an
effect today only through changes in the timing of profit.

Second, if

agents have infinite horizons p=O, the effect is again zero (recall that
A =r when

1

p=O), even if there is imperfect competition.

The reason is that

when people have infinite horizons, they do not care when the profits are
collected.

12

Third, if there is imperfect competition and finite horizons,

See Footnote 1.
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the experiment will always be expansionary.

The reason is that individuals

will not react to the very distant future decrease in expenditure as much as
they will do to the near future increase, since they know that there is a
probability (equal to 1-e-ph) that they will not pay the costs of future
government spending contraction due to death.

Again, this policy is like a

transfer from the future: the government takes the profits of future
generations and gives them to currently alive individuals.

Since future

generations have a zero marginal propensity to consume and current cohorts
have a positive one, the experiment will be expansionary.

Thus, changing

the timing of future spending has real economic effects today.

(7) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

This paper studies the effect of introducing imperfect competition in a
finite horizon model of fiscal policy.

The main findings are that the

existence of monopoly rents can overturn some of the traditional results on
the timing of government purchases and taxes.

First I find that the

qualitative results of a temporary bond financed tax cut are not changed,
although their quantitative nature is different and reflects some multiplier
effects similar to those highlighted by Mankiw (1988).

I then show that an

anticipated increase in public spending financed with future taxes may have
an expansionary effect on aggregate demand.

This unconventional result

stems from the fact that the monopoly rents associated with the extra
spending will represent a positive wealth effect which tends to offset the
traditional negative wealth effect of anticipated taxes.

This policy

experiment is analogous to a transfer from the generations paying higher
taxes to the generations receiving the monopoly rents.
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If current

generations have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of wealth than
future ones, this experiment may have a positive (non-conventional) effect
on aggregate demand, current account deficit and/or real interest rates.
The second non conventional result is that, when there are monopoly
rents, changing the timing of future public spending has real effects, even
though the present path of taxes is left unchanged.

I show that an

anticipated temporary increase in public expenditures financed by subsequent
cuts in public spending will trigger a transfer of monopoly rents from
future generations to current ones.

Again, if the current marginal

propensity to consume out of wealth is higher for currently living
individuals, this experiment will have expansionary effects.
The results in this paper suggest that the existence of imperfect
competition and monopoly rents may play an important role in the way we
think about dynamic fiscal policy.
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APPENDIX 1.

Derivation of equations (4.6), (4.7) (4.8) and (4.9)

Let me start from equation (4.5):

(4.5) X(t) = m ( W(t) + M(t) + µK(t))

where m=r+p-(1/a)(r-o), and W(t), M(t)and K(t) are defined in the text.
We can take the time derivative of X(t), W(t), M(t) and K(t) to get the
following system (we drop the time subscripts):

(Al) X =

m(

W + M + µK)

(A2) W = D + F = rD + r -

~

+ rF +IT+ E - X - r =

= rW - (1-µ)X + E (A3) M = (r+p)M - (E -

~

~

+ µr.

+ µr)

(A4) µK = µ(r+p)K - µX

We can now plug (A2), (A3) and (A4) in (Al) to get:

(A6) X = m[rW + (r+p)(M + µK) -X]

But from (Al), we know that M + µK = -W + X/(o+p), which we can plug in
(A6) to get the following system of two linear non-homogeneous differential
equations.

(A7) X(t)
W(t)

(1/a)(r-o)X(t) - p(r+p-(1/a)(r-o))W(t)
-(1-µ)X(t) + rW(t) + E-~(t)+µr(t)
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It will be convenient to operate in real terms.

Let me divide both

equations by the marginal cost, 1, and let me use the fact the the price
marginal cost ratio is equal to 1/(l-µ) to get the following system

C(t)

(A7)'

(1/a)(r-o)C(t) - pm(l-µ)W(t)/1 W(t)/1

=

=

-C(t) + rW(t)/1

+ E/1-T(t)/(l-µ)+ (µ/(l-µ))G(t)

which corresponds to equation (4.6) in the text.

In order to solve this

system of differential equations it will be convenient to write it as

(A8) J

+ H(s)

AJ

.

With J =

t·

l(s)l

=

·2(s)
H(s) = [
J2

0

l

, A=

W(s)/1

O
]
E/1-T(s)/1+(µ/( l-µ))G(s) .

is predetermined.

stability.

[(1/a) (r-o)
-1

-pm(l-µ)l

and

r

Jl is the jumping variable and J2 (0)=

I require det(A)<O so we have the desired saddle path

This, in turn, implies that the system has two real eigenvalue

of opposite sign.
A <0.
2

[C(s)

Without loss of generality, let's assume that A >0 and
1

Let C be the matrix of corresponding eigenvectors.

We can transform

A to Jordan canonical form A= CAC -1 where A is the diagonal matrix of
characteristic roots.

Let's premultiply both sides of (A8) by c -1 and

-1

define Y = C J to get:

(A9) Y

The differential equations system has been reduced to a two lxl
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differential equations with solutions:

(AlO) Yi(t)

e

A.t
1

t

Yi(O) +

eAitJ

e

A.s
1

BiH(s)ds

for i

1, 2.

0

.
h e 1. th row o f t h e matrix
. c•l .
B1. 1st
were
h
see that lim Yl(t)

co

Now since I took A >0, we
1

unless we choose Yl(O) to be

t=

co

-J e -Asl [bll

(All) Yl(O)

bl2]H(s) ds.

0

In other words, we need to choose Yl(O) (initial value of the jumping
variable) to be exactly at the stable arm.
J variables.

Now I can transform back to the

By definition,

(Al2) Yl(O) = bll Jl(O) + bl2 J2(0) so

(Al4) Jl(O)

=

Yl(O)/bll - J2(0) (bl2/bll)
-1 (

= -bll

bl2 J2(0)

=

bl2) H(s)ds)
0

In our particular case we can write (Al4) as:

(Al5) C(O) -

6( Y(O)

+

I.-Als

[E/1-T(t)/(l-µ)+(µ/(l-µ))G(t)]ds]

0

So ~=-bl2/bll. This equation corresponds to equation (4.7) in the text.
The final step is to find the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of matrix A.
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We

know that the characteristic equation will be of the form A2 -tr(A)A+det(A).
So the two eigenvalues will be:

2
tr(A) ± /tr(A) - 4det(A)
(Al6) A
2

Since det(A) <0, the two roots will be real and one of each sign.
They are

(Al7)

2
where~= /[r-(l/a)(r-o)] +4(r+p-(r-o)/a)p(l-µ).
corresponds to equation (4.9) in the text.

Vl
V2

{ pm(l-µ)

The positive root Al

The associated eigenvectors are

(-r-~+(r-o)/a)/2
1

(r+~-(r-o)/a)/2

We can plug them as columns of Matrix C which, when inverted, will give
us the coefficients b

11

, b

12

, b
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and b
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:
[(l/a)(r-o)-r-~]/2]

(Al7) B = C-l

*det(C)
pm(l-µ)

Thus,

~

= -bl2/bll = (l/2)(r +

~

equation (4.8) in the text.
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-(r-o)/a), which corresponds to

_1
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